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“Virtuous beings”: The Concept of tha
damtshig, and Being a Moral Person in
Contemporary Bhutanese Society
This paper sets out a preliminary investigation of tha damtshig. In particular, it examines
the concept of tha damtshig, and its role in the creation of a sense of moral identity among
contemporary Bhutanese. The concept of tha damtshig is central to Bhutanese social
values and based on Buddhist teachings. However, more recently the concept has become
intertwined with notions of loyalty to the state and political allegiance. By focusing on
how the concept of tha damtshig is created and embodied in everyday life, and in its use to
create and maintain a moral sense of personhood, we can discern the interplay between
popular, ground-level understandings and perspectives and state policies as Bhutan seeks
to balance social and political transformation with maintaining its traditional values.

Introduction
Ngawang scowled and exclaimed “they have
no tha damtshig” as he described an attack on a
small remote temple in central Bhutan. From the
beginning of my fieldwork I encountered the term
tha damtshig that left me floundering. Typically, I
would smile—uncertain of what was being referred
to or its significance. Gradually, the importance of
tha damtshig and its meaning for lay Bhutanese began
to emerge. I soon realised that my pre-field work
readings on Bhutan and the wider Himalayan region
had not prepared me for this concept and over the
following two years, I found myself returning to it
time and time again. Tha damtshig literally means
“the highest promise” or “ultimate vow” from the
word damtshig referring to the Buddhist vows
(samaya). More precisely, the term damtshig refers
to vows taken as part of a tantric commitment, or
as a “pledge which ought not to be transgressed”
(Phuntsho 2004:569).1 Yet, sitting in the kitchen
of Sengge’s house with his nephew Ngawang and
his friends, the term did not refer to monastic or
tantric vows.2 More recently, a Bhutanese friend
1. See Dudjom Rinpoche 1996 for further details on tantric
vows.
2. I have used pseudonyms throughout the paper. Sengge is
a tailor and former monk from Lhuntse. Aged in his 60s, he and
his wife Palden, shared their small two room house with their
nephew Ngawang and daughter, Chotsho. It was one of the first
Bhutanese homes I entered and over the course of fieldwork it
became my “home”.

and colleague wrote, “it may also be noted that tha
damtshig is used more frequently in Bhutan than in
other Himalayan countries and done so mostly in a
social context” (ibid: 570).
My paper sets out a preliminary investigation of
tha damtshig. In particular, I examine the concept of
tha damtshig, and its role in the creation of a sense
of moral identity among contemporary Bhutanese.
The concept of tha damtshig is, in my opinion,
central to Bhutanese social values. Sonam Kinga
describes it as a “commitment and obligation of love,
honour and loyalty in one’s relationship with other
people”(2001:156). The social values of tha damtshig
are based on Buddhist teachings, yet more recently
have become intertwined with notions of loyalty to
the state and political allegiance (Phuntsho 2004).
The ethnic and linguistic diversity of Bhutanese
is counterpoised by an underlying unity—the
lives they lead, the social encounters and realities
they experience as well as the selves they imagine
and seek to project all “reflect or refract pervasive
religious and moral values” (Parrish 1994:4). 3
Accordingly, my paper describes and examines
the “pervasive religious and moral values” that
3. My focus is on the northern Bhutanese, rather than the
Lhotshampa, Bhutanese of Nepalese descent who are primarily
Hindu. The northern Bhutanese cover two of the largest minority
groups— the Ngalong and the Sharchop, as well as the smaller
linguistic/ethnic groups who are predominately Buddhist. See
Pommaret 1997a for more information on the “ethnic mosaic” of
Bhutan.
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pervade and shape Bhutanese society and their significance
for providing a moral framework and vocabulary which
permeates everyday life. By focusing on how the concept of
tha damtshig is created and embodied in everyday life, and in
its use to create and maintain a moral sense of personhood,
we can discern the interplay between popular, groundlevel understandings and perspectives and state policies as
Bhutan seeks to balance social and political transformation
with maintaining its traditional values. This everyday
understanding and practice is therefore an ever-evolving
process as a result of both an internal and external dialogue.

Driglam Namzha: a brief note
As I discuss tha damtshig I refer on occasion to driglam
namzha. 4 For many Bhutanese, driglam namzha refers to the
code of conduct and manner of deportment introduced by
the seventeenth century founder of Bhutan, the Zhabdrung,
Ngawang Namgyal. A publication by the National Library of
Bhutan states that the Zhabdrung “promulgated the ‘Chayig
Chhenmo’ (Great Law Code) containing specific instructions,
which are inscribed on slate at the entrance to Punakha
Dzong.” (1999:xxxvii). Although the National Library text and
other recent works (Dasho Khadro 1997; Royal Chamberlain
1999), on driglam namzha present it as being applied to all
Bhutanese, my own reading is that it was primarily directed
at the state clergy and government officials of the Drukpa
government established by the Zhabdrung.5 Over time, the
practices of driglam namzha were either applied to or adopted
by ordinary Bhutanese.6 Unlike the concept of tha damtshig,
driglam namzha is not “bound by a religious context” (Phuntsho
2004:572). The code of conduct or etiquette regulates the
form of appropriate dress to be worn by Bhutanese when
visiting various public or government buildings, the form of
greeting and how to conduct specific forms of ceremonies that
mark the beginning and end of public events. In 1989 a royal
edict re-emphasised the importance of driglam namzha as a
key feature of Bhutanese cultural identity. In January 2009
4. Driglam namzha (Tib./Dz: sgrigs lam rnam gzhag) is not examined
in this paper since the focus is on tha damtshig. A separate paper on driglam
namzha is currently in progress.
5. Phuntsho suggests that “The Zhabdrung and his immediate
circle perhaps can be rightly credited with the earliest implementation of
driglam as a formal practice at an institutional level” (2004:573). He rightly
points out that “driglam, in the form of loose and informal adoption of
proper behaviour and manner, existed even before the Zhabdrung and his
establishment of organised institutions” (ibid).
6. I argue that driglam namzha was initially applied to government
officials based on an eighteenth century law text that admonishes
government officials about how to behave towards the people. More
specifically, it is a very refined form of social etiquette that on the day to
day level of village life would not be required. Rather, my informants talked
about bey zha (sb/’bad bzhag), an everyday form of manners that embodied
respect and consideration towards family and neighbors without either the
formal or hierarchical aspects of driglam namzha.
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the National Assembly re-affirmed the importance of driglam
namzha. Kuensel noted that:
the house agreed that a mere rule would not help
in preserving and promoting traditional etiquette
(Drig-lam –namzha). It should come from within
people [They] must be made aware of its advantages
and the harmony it can create in any relation[ship?]
and to society as a whole. (Kuensel 3 January 2009).

Following the 1989 edict, driglam namzha assumed a
political significance as it became associated with what
was viewed as the promotion of the cultural practices of
the northern Bhutanese over their southern neighbors, the
Lhotshampa (Hutt 2003).7 Whilst for northern Bhutanese,
driglam namzha “came to be viewed more and more as the
formal and structured display of official etiquette rather
than as the fluid and spontaneous practice of good manners”
(Phuntsho 2004). More specifically, driglam namzha has
come to symbolise Bhutanese traditional values and cultural
identity.

Tradition and Morality
Throughout my discussions with Bhutanese on tha
damtshig were frequent references to “tradition” and morality.
Before turning to consider tha damtshig, it is important to
reflect on the meanings implied by these terms. The claim
“It’s tradition!” can suggest a temporal framework that lacks
a clear beginning and marks off the historical period from
“modernity”. In effect, the past and present are distanced,
if not, actually separated. This approach is deeply flawed. It
suggests a rupture between past and present, whilst assuming
that the contemporary or the modern are the products of
such a rupture. A second approach to tradition emphasises
it as strongly normative (Shils, 1981). For Shils, tradition is
“far more than the statistically frequent reoccurrence over
a succession of generations of similar beliefs, practices,
institutions and works”(1981:24). Rather, tradition “is [the]
normative transmission which links the generations of
the dead with the generations of the living” (1981:24). So,
tradition is not left behind in the transition to modernity,
instead tradition is what modernity requires to prevent society
falling apart. This second approach to tradition is reflected in
the various representations and invocations of tradition made
by Bhutanese scholars and lay people alike, as they discuss
the process of social transformation in Bhutan (cf. Ura 1994,
1995, 1997; RGOB 1999a).
Hobsbawm in his well-known and oft cited introduction
to The Invention of Tradition (1984), distinguishes between
“invented tradition” and “custom”. He identifies “invented
tradition” with super-structural institutions and elites
whilst he conceives “custom” to be popular and capable of
7. I do not examine the conflict between the Royal Government
and the Lhotshampa in this paper. For more information see Hutt 2003,
Phuntsho 2006.

being mobilised at society’s base. He presents tradition as
imposing fixed practices and custom as flexible and capable
of accommodating a certain amount of innovation, while still
providing the sanction of “precedent, social continuity and
natural law” (1984:). As Vlastos (1998) points out there are
limits to the utility of Hobsbawm’s approach. First, is the
frequent criticism that all traditions are socially constructed,
and therefore in some sense invented. Second is the
unresolved dichotomy Hobsbawm creates between tradition
and custom. There is a disjunction between the rhetorical
aspect of tradition represented in the claim to invariance,
and the continually shifting subjective aspect, which is
institutionalised in practices and texts, which are reorganised
and reformulated over brief periods of time without apparent
loss of authority. Hobsbawm’s emphasis on the elite/popular
dichotomy stresses the role of the elite in the formulation of
tradition. However, as Vlastos notes “Traditions, like customs,
are embedded in larger social structures that are constantly
reshaped by the forces of change . . . they aim to arrest”
(1998:4). Therefore we need to recognise that they are not
static, nor are they exclusively top-down.
It is therefore crucial to stress the “social and historical
roles and statuses” of my Bhutanese informants who embody
what are described as traditional values, for these are central
elements to the narratives they produce. Their lives, and
therefore the narratives they use to explain their daily lives,
are deeply and firmly located within the wider narratives of
their communities, from which they derive their sense of being
Bhutanese. According to Alistair MacIntyre, each person is a
“bearer of a tradition” (1981: 221). These traditional practices
or values provide each individual with a moral identity, a base
point from which he or she is able to develop their own moral
particularity.
This leads to the next element—the role of morality. What
do I mean by being a “moral” person? Based on the material
presented, I have chosen to delineate the term “moral” to refer
to notions of good and bad, of appropriate and inappropriate
conduct, of respect and humility versus disrespectful actions.
notions of civic responsibility and more recently loyalty to the
nation-state. Kaviraj comments that “concepts are implicit in
social practices” and “though not always verbalized, either in
everyday or intellectual forms, these ideas are nevertheless
social concepts” (1997:83). The concept of tha damtshig is
part of the daily repetitiveness of everyday life, when people
are engaged “in their everyday interpretation of the world –
to describe what they see and evaluate what they approve
or deplore” (Kaviraj 1997:83). In essence, I am seeking to
delineate notions of “moral sense”, as reflected and embedded
in the practices, social interactions and narratives of the
Bhutanese.
The emphasis on the performative aspect of morality is
crucial. Rather than treating morality and moral states as
restricted to highly marked decisive events, it is important
to focus our attention on the practical routines of everyday
life. Ideas of morality are intertwined in the personal choices
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and actions engaged in on an individual level during the
course of everyday life. A sense of the moral, or rather the
virtuous, can be found in the continuous acts engaged in
by people. However, whilst the communicative aspect of
action and practice encompasses the moral domain, two
other significant factors require to be considered: personal
agency, on the one hand, and on the other, moral reasoning.
Without wishing to become side-tracked by a discussion of
ideas of moral philosophy, both of these factors form part
of the weaving together of a personal sense of virtue and of
moral conduct.
In addition, although I have used the singular “morality”,
I should be speaking of “moralities” (Howell 1997; Parrish
1994). This better recognises the diversity of moralities
expressed by individuals. More importantly, as I have
come to think about the connection between morality
and law, it is important not to see morality as a coherent
imposed system. Therefore, rather than treating morality
as an unequivocal code, it is more relevant and fruitful to
treat morality as the “form and acts by which commitments
are engaged and virtue accomplished” (Lambek 2000:316).
Central to this paper are the strong links between morality
and practice as understood by the Bhutanese and outlined
in the following section. However, I do not want to reduce
morality and its practice to mere actions. Whilst I argue that
morality is a learned practice, one embodied by the actor
or agent, it is not reduced to mere habit. Indeed, morality
requires personal agency and moral reasoning, for these are
the basis from which people choose to act in a particular
way—virtuously or non-virtuously. As MacIntyre notes “the
exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part of the
[good] life, not merely a preparatory exercise to secure such
a life” (1981:149). The relationship between moral values,
of moralities in the plural, and practices is a dynamic one:
“Values are continuously changing and adapting through
actual choices and practices, while, at the same time, they
continue to inform and shape choices and practices” (Howell
1997:4). As Karma Phuntsho notes these values can become
secularised and, in his view, distorted, as they are associated
with political loyalty and submission to the ruling power of
the government (2004).

‘Dul wa and Tshulkhrims: Moral
Discipline and Social Harmony
From a Bhutanese perspective the concept of tha damtshig
seeks not only to promote social harmony, it seeks to establish
and maintain social justice. This perspective is reminiscent
of the concept of wa, the spirit of peace and harmony in
Japan (Kimio 1998:300) and li or “principle” in the sense of
underlying “source of natural order” in China (Perenboom
1993:47). In this section, I examine Buddhist philosophy,
which I separate into two categories, doctrine and discipline,
and the principle doctrinal features which shape tha damtshig.
Underlying tha damtshig are Buddhist teachings on moral
discipline (Tib/Dz: tshul khrims) and karma (Tib/Dz: las).
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Buddhist teachings on morality and conduct form the basis
for these concepts. These concepts revolve around developing
a moral life based on social interaction on the one hand, and
the cultivation of mental awareness on the other. There is
a strong intertwining thread between the development of a
sense of moral understanding and daily life.
‘Dul wa means “to subdue, tame, overcome” and refers
primarily to the vinaya section of the Kangyur (Buddhist
commentaries) relating to monastic rules of conduct. 8
The vinaya sets out the codes of conduct for the Buddhist
monastic community. In the monastery, ‘dul wa is used to
refer to the various levels of vows, therefore the discipline
to be adhered to by the lay householder, the novice monks
and those holding full monastic ordination.9 However, the
term ‘dul wa is important for it carries beyond the monastic
community, and is central to any understanding of tha
damtshig. In her work on Ladakh, Day (1986) has, like other
authors, highlighted the civilising process of the introduction
of Buddhist teachings (chos). The teachings subdue, or rather
tame, the region, not only the unruly, harmful local deities,
but the human population as well (see also Ekvall 1968). In
Bhutan, to embody tha damtshig, together with the practice
and embodiment of good manners (bey zha or the more
formal, driglam namzha,) is to train or tame one’s natural wild
impulses into a way of behaving that accords with Buddhist
teachings, which emphasises the link between the actions of
body, speech and mind (Whitecross 2002).
The teachings are distilled for lay people in the Sixteen
Rules that claim a legitimacy based on the belief that they
were originally promulgated by the seventh century Tibetan
king, Songtsen Gampo.10 The “sixteen virtuous acts”11 are set
out in a Class IX - X school text entitled Bhutan Civics as:
Michoe Tsangma Chudrug12
Not to:
1: kill, commit theft or robbery
2: have wrong faith
8.

3: go against the wishes of parents
4: be disrespectful to elders, learned men and leaders
5: foster evil thoughts towards family and friends
6: refrain from helping your neighbours
7: be dishonest
8: follow bad examples
9: be greedy and selfish
10: foster evil thoughts in others
11: be late in refunding(repaying) your debts
12: cheat
13: segregate human beings into rich and poor, high and low
14: listen to wrong (evil) advice
15: be deceitful: and
16: lose patience or be short-tempered.
(RBG 1999b:51).
These principles were referred to by many Bhutanese as we
discussed tha damtshig (even if they were unable to recite all of
them). According to Gendun Rinchen, a monk from Kurtoe in
north-eastern Bhutan, these form “the basis for leading a good
life”. Later, these same principles were described by Ngawang,
a traditional doctor from Dechencholing, as “the Bhutanese
alphabet”—the fundamental moral basis of conduct. In one
interview that explored reactions to a series of desecration of
sacred sites, those responsible for the desecration of religious
sites were described as “forgetting the alphabet”. When asked
to clarify, the response was that “they lack tha damtshig” (see
Whitecross, 2000, 2008).13
Underlying the sixteen principles are the ten virtues (dge ba
bcu) and their corresponding non-virtues. This presentation
of the sixteen principles and the ten virtues appears in a
number of contemporary Bhutanese texts, including a short
introduction to the legal system of Bhutan on the website of the
High Court of Justice.14 The frequency with which Bhutanese
used ideas of virtuous and non-virtuous actions, or rather as
it was described sinful ones (sdig pa/lasip), depended on their
age and general level of education. However, even amongst
those Bhutanese most scornful of the monastic community
and critical of Buddhism, the notion of virtue and non-virtue
permeated and informed their perspective on their own and
other’s actions. The ten virtues refer to the basic Buddhist
teachings on karma. Rather than a simple litany of “do not
kill, steal and so forth” the ten pious acts are set out with a
degree of implied explanation:
The Ten Pious Acts
1: to love and be gentle to all living creatures;
2: to take things only with the permission of the owner;
3: refrain from committing adultery;
13. This phrase was one that I heard often during fieldwork.
14. It should be noted that this association of the sixteen principles and
ten virtues is historically contentious. It is probably a post hoc rationalisation
of Songtsen Gampo’s laws which was in place by the fourteenth century (see
Kapstein 2000, Richardson 1998, and Sorenson 1994).
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4: not to tell lies;
5: not to create problems among friends;
6: not to be rude or hurt the feelings of others;
7: not to be jealous or talk wantonly;
8: not to be greedy, or want the belongings of others;
9: not to wish ill luck on others;
10: to have faith in religion.
(RBG 1999b:52)
The school text describes the Zhabdrung, Ngawang
Namgyal, founder of Bhutan, as formulating the “first set of
laws in our country . . . codification of laws were completed in
1652 . . . These laws were deeply influenced by the teachings
of Buddhism. According to these laws people were required
to practice Michoe Tsangma Chudrug (sixteen virtuous acts)
and Lhachoe Gyewa Chu (the ten pious acts)” (1999b:50).15
Engaging in the ten virtuous actions is “said in the
Ratnavali . . . to deliver beings from birth in the hells and
the realms of pretas (hungry spirits) and animals” (Kangyur
Rinpoche, 2001: 61). All actions, physical, mental of verbal
have a consequence and this is usually referred to as
lejumdre,16 the law of karmic cause and effect that is central
to Buddhist teachings. The “ten pious acts” appear in a
striking presentation in a Dzongkha language textbook (RBG
1991). The chapter sets the ten virtues and their antonym
non-virtues at length and ends with a series of questions
for the pupil to consider. The questions re-emphasise the
three virtues and non-virtues of the body, the four virtues
and non-virtues of speech and the final three associated with
the mind. These final three are important for, according to
Buddhist teachings, without control over one’s mind, there
can be no control over the actions of body and speech. The
importance of mental intention, including the mental aspect
of self-discipline, is central to Buddhist teachings on karma
and karmic effect stress. In particular, the karmic effect of
an action is greatest when the action has been consciously
and deliberately done whether it is making offerings with a
pure motivation or killing another living being. (Kangyur
Rinpoche 2001).17
Beyond the doctrinal aspect, the importance of the
“sixteen principles for harmonious living” and the “ten
virtues and non-virtues” lies in the major focus they place on
social relations. Whereas monks and religious practitioners
are encouraged to distance themselves from society, in
15. The Zhabdrung, Ngawang Namgyal, was a Druk Kagyu hierarch
who fled Ralung in southern Tibet in 1616 following a dispute over his
recognition as a reincarnation of a major Druk Kagyu lama. Between
1616 and his death in 1651, the Zhabdrung established a religious form
of government that was to last until the early twentieth century and
the installation of the Wangchuck dynasty as hereditary monarchs. See
Pommaret 1997.
16. Lejumdre (Tib./Dz: las rgyu ‘bras).
17. For a detailed explanation on the connection between action and
karmic effect see Kangyur Rinpoche 2001 Chapter 3.

75

HIMALAYA XXVIII (1-2) 2008

general for the laity the “social aspects of life are given a
more important place” (Rajavaramuni 1990:49). Listening to
Sengge, an elderly Bhutanese man and his conversation with
family and visitors, the importance of these values in shaping
and defining everyday social relations became clearer to
me. Embodying a succinct synthesis of complex Buddhist
doctrines, and legitimated by their associated legends of
origin, for example their formulation by Songtsen Gampo,
or the Zhabdrung, the concept of tha damtshig and the
way of conducting oneself (bey zha and the formal driglam
namzha18) underpin Bhutanese notions of morality and social
obligations. “Cultural etiquette such as showing respect, and
being obedient, disciplined, loyal, and dedicated are a large
part of the sacred Bhutanese tradition”, argues Tshering
Dolkar (2000:87). The phrase “returning kindness” was
often used by Sengge and other Bhutanese when explaining
tha damtshig stressing, as I understood, the importance of
mutual support and reliance based on good social relations.
According to Karma Ura, a contemporary Bhutanese
scholar, the role of the tantric lama and the relationship
between lama and disciple was mentioned as forming an
important model of the social relationship between lay
people. The lama, as the embodiment of the teachings is
respected and followed faithfully by his disciple. Even if
the lama appears to behave in an inappropriate manner,
the faith of the disciple should not be shaken, for the lama
may be acting in a certain way for a higher spiritual purpose
(e.g. the Buddhist saint, Drukpa Kunley who behaved in
an unorthodox manner see Dowman and Paljor1980). This
sense of devotion and respect is reflected in the concept of
tha damtshig. However, it is the role of the lama as the person
who tames or rather teaches the disciple how to control
their nature in order to follow the teachings, that is most
significant for our understanding of tha damtshig. In Bhutan
and across the Himalayan region, stories of lamas having
to re-subdue local deities who have become unruly and
causing harm are common in Bhutan (indeed throughout
the Himalayan region see: Mumford 1989; Dujardin 1997).
Indeed, seventeenth and eighteenth century Bhutanese text
present the Zhabdrung as taming Bhutan as he asserted his
spiritual and temporal authority mirroring the tales of the
tantric adept, Padmasambhava pacifying local demons in
Tibet and central Bhutan in the eighth century.19 The need to
re-subdue local deities is the corollary of the on-going need
for human beings to exert control over themselves, often
with the advice and guidance of the lama.
This brings us to an important consideration. The
relationship between lama and disciple, on which the lay
model is based, emphasises the importance of devotion and
respect towards the lama. However, there is a reciprocal
obligation on the part of the lama. As several informants
18. See footnote 7.
19. Mills (2003) provides a very good discussion of this see p260, 314
– 315, 330 – 331.
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emphasised, the lama, as the moral superior, is responsible
for uplifting his disciple and helping release the individual
from samsara. Therefore, the lama has a major responsibility
to fulfil. The disciple can do, so it is claimed, anything except
break his or her trust in the lama. This would represent
an unredeemable stain of their damtshig, or vows. This
relationship of lama and disciple was described to me by
Karma Ura as representing “the fundamental order which
must be maintained”.20 There is an obligation on the part of
all those to whom respect is given to help those below. The
metaphor of a waterfall was used on one occasion to describe
how this social obligation cascades down from the king, to
his ministers, the government officials, down to grandparents
and parents and siblings. Yet, for many informants this
represents an abstract ideal. Although certain individuals
would be commented on as being “good” exemplars of
possessing tha damtshig, few could identify exemplars that
all Bhutanese would recognise. The king, a person who is
generally highly regarded, was described as too distant to be
a practical exemplar. Although his actions and those of his
grandfather and father are praised, the majority of Bhutanese
tend to look closer to their own families and communities for
examples of how to conduct themselves.
Finally, as various writers have noted (Aziz 1981, Levine
1981, Ardussi and Epstein 1978, Epstein and Lichter 1983,
Mumford 1989, Samuel 1993), the belief in karma, with its
emphasis on virtue, co-exists with concerns which emphasise
this-world. Attending a day long ritual on Nagarjun Mountain
to the west of Kathmandu with a group of 16 monks, Pema
Namgyel, a former government driver turned monk from
Mongar in central Bhutan, explained the purpose of the ritual
as being conducted for the general well-being, health and
prosperity of his adopted father and mother. Although his
own birth parents were still alive and he continued to look
after them, Pema was supported through his education by his
adopted family. Therefore, funding the ritual demonstrated
his respect and affection for his adopted parents, in other
words, demonstrated tha damtshig. Mumford (1989) notes
a similar issue with regard to funerals. The performance of
merit-raising for the deceased could only really be performed
by those who shared inheritance (broadly defined) with
the dead person. Similarly, the household rituals I attended
in Thimphu and Kabesa mirrored the same concerns with
the removal of obstacles, as well as, creating merit. Epstein
and Lichter note that the belief among Tibetans in karma
coexists with concerns about their own good fortune. Thus,
they attempt to achieve worldly success, while maintaining a
“slightly ironic detachment” from it due to its impermanent
nature (Epstein and Lichter 1983:257). As Levine notes:

20. This can be illustrated from the namthar of the Buddhist saint,
Milarepa. The principal obstacle to his spiritual development was not his
use of black magic. Rather the fact that he forged a letter from his teacher,
Marpa. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this useful example.
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on the one hand, one can point to a set of unvarying
moral precepts, fixed in Buddhist textual tradition
to which all . . . overtly subscribe. On the other
hand, there are also implicit values which are
manifested in actual patterns of behaviour…The
various cultural messages encountered – from
given moral precepts, implicit societal values, inner
impulses and public valuation of conduct – may
well prove contradictory (1981:122 – 123).

It is necessary therefore not simply to look at the notion
of tha damtshig as an abstract idea, but a set of practices in
everyday life.

Tha damtshig: Respect and Reciprocity
In the previous section, I outlined the religious context
that informs and shapes the concept of tha damtshig.
However, its importance for Bhutanese emerged gradually as
I listened and observed and, to be honest, asked initially at
least, naive questions. I recall one evening as Sengge and I
sat amidst bolts of silks and brocades. Sengge was a tailor
(and former monk) who with amazing speed and accuracy
cut the materials and began to lay out the fabric frame for a
thangka (religious painting) depicting Guru Rinpoche. Over
a period of several months, I had become close to Sengge, his
wife, Palden and Ngawang, his youngest nephew. Haltingly, I
asked him about tha damtshig. “I don’t know how to explain
it. It is tha damtshig.” Ngawang intervened. As he spoke, a
general sense of how he and his family understood tha
damtshig emerged. He explained that due to Sengge’s age,
his knowledge, and his kindness to Ngawang he was to be
honored and respected. It was at this point that I heard the
phrase “repaying kindness” for the first time. Ngawang’s own
father had separated from his mother when Ngawang was
still an infant and it was Sengge who cared for Ngawang and
encouraged him to pursue his studies of Tibetan medicine at
the Chakpori Institute in Darjeeling.
A few days afterwards, I observed Ngawang greeting
various men at a social gathering: he politely greeted the most
senior men before turning to greet the younger men with
whom he watched football and generally spent time when not
working. Depending on their age, and the degree to which
he knew each man, he altered his demeanor to mark the
distinction between peer group friends, and those to whom a
more formal display of respect was due. Yet his friends, mainly
apprentice sculptors or school students a few years younger
than Ngawang, would address him formally as drungtsho
(doctor) with broad smiles. Although he was accepted as
part of their group, they all at various times commented to
me on his intelligence and knowledge, as demonstrated by
the completion of his medical studies. Ngawang could, and
often did play the part of the mischief maker, the joker, and
this was expected of him. However, this did not detract from
the respect offered to him. Even the older men to whom
he demonstrated respect through his body language, the
tone and phrasing he used when speaking, returned the

respect to Ngawang. It was equally revealing to watch how
he interacted with his elder brother, a junior abbot in the
monastery. Although, Ngawang would laugh and even repeat
quite bawdy stories in his elder brother’s presence, Gendun
was always treated with the respect due to his rank—small
details of everyday contact reflected this – the serving of
food, the seating arrangements and the tendency to use more
“honorific” language.
Reflecting on what I observed, was told and overheard I
gradually realised that tha damtshig is not an easily defined
concept. Rather, it is simultaneously a concept, an ideal to
be striven for, and an embodied practice demanding full
awareness of one’s social status, and the actions of body,
speech and mind thereby linking it with good manners. At
its core is a deep sense of social responsibility and reciprocity.
In a detailed text on driglam namzha, the Royal Chamberlain
in his discussion of tha damtshig refers to the importance of
showing “faith and respect” as well as “repaying kindness” to a
range of people. In part this is based on their rank—king, the
queens, ministers and officials, as well as teachers (1999:32).
However, it also emphasises showing respect to one’s parents

The “Four Friends”. From a mural in P unakha Dzong, Bhutan.
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and elders. He illustrates his comments with a reference to a
popular folk story, “The Four Friends” (Dz: spun bzhi).21
In the Bhutanese version, as in the Tibetan one, four
friends, a bird, a rabbit, a monkey and an elephant, live
below a banyan tree. There had been a decline in their
mutual respect for each other ,and in order to decide which
amongst them is the most senior, they begin to discuss the
age of the tree. The elephant recalls that, when he was a
baby, the tree was as small as a bush. The monkey recalls it
was a mere shrub when he was young. The rabbit describes
the tree as having been a leafless sapling. Finally, the bird
comments that he had swallowed the seed, and that the
tree had grown from his droppings. Thereby, the bird was
honoured as the eldest, senior in rank to the rabbit, the
monkey and the elephant. This restored harmony to the
animal kingdom. Accordingly, it is said that the Buddha
used this story to decree that age would confer priority in
the sangha (religious community). The image of the four
21. This story is derived from the Tittira Jataka, though in the original
only three animals are mentioned.

P hoto: A rjun Guneratne

Virtuous Beings/Whitecross

friends can be found painted on buildings, in small wood
carvings and on calendars. Occasionally, the image shows
the four friends standing on each other’s backs, in order to
pick the fruit of the banyan tree. Here the image refers to the
equally important moral of co-operation. The circulation of
this and other such tales was revealed when walking from
a popular picnic area overlooking Thimphu with the three
eldest children of a close friend. This second version of the
story was retold by the youngest child, Kesang, as the group
tried to reach pine cones in the branches overhanging the side
of the path.
To show respect and indeed devotion to one’s elders, and
especially parents and grandparents, was the most frequent
way in which Bhutanese explained tha damtshig.22 Yet, this
devotion can be difficult. As his life story gradually unfolded a
close friend from central Bhutan, Kezang, repeatedly stressed
how much he owed not to his father but to his maternal uncle
(Dz. azhang), Dorji. After Kezang’s mother’s death, when he
was about ten years old, Dorji ,who had been able to attend
school while living with Kezang’s parents in Trongsar, decided
that he should look after Kezang. Although only nineteen
years older, Dorji felt that it was his duty to care for Kezang.
Kezang’s father is a small farmer and, more significantly, a
heavy drinker, who could not provide for Kezang,. When
he was brought from his home village of Nabji, Dorji recalls
playing with young monks in Trongsar dzong and leaving
Kezang aged two on the roof of the dzong. Only when he
heard Kezang’s father bellowing across from the town and
pointing to the roof did he remember and rescue Kezang. “I
always feel bad when I think of what could have happened
to my Kezang”. The frequent use of “my Kezang”, and the
plans to buy a plot of land for him near Dorji’s own land in
Thimphu, emphasised the bond between them. For Kezang,
respect and devotion to his uncle is absolute. Yet, although
Kezang sends money to his father in Gelephug, he seldom
mentions or discusses his father. Respect and devotion are
not so simple to command. Kezang does the minimum he is
required to do to be seen to respect his father, but his heartfelt
emotional tie is to his maternal uncle. His bond to his uncle
was also reflected in his devotion to his grandmother. These
bonds, however, go beyond the outward requirement to
show respect. They draw on deeper ties of affection, in which
respect is only one dimension.
Seniority and age may be held up as requiring respect and
honour. Yet, on an everyday level among peers, there appears
to be a levelling out. Here rank tends to be less important
than the idea of co-operation and mutual assistance. Drinking
tea with Sengge and his wife, it was common for neighbours
to arrive and ask for help. Either Sengge or his wife would
leave to provide whatever assistance was required. Often,
due to Sengge’s background as a monk and his knowledge
of rituals, he would be called upon to assist with household
22. This is encapsulated in phrases such as “pha dang bu gzhi gi tha
damtshig”—the reciprocal duties and obligations of parents and children.
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rituals when members of a house fell ill. His wife, Palden,
would often provide help by preparing meals and caring for
children. The frequency with which people called on one
another for assistance, and the apparent lack of resentment at
the disruption these demands created, prompted me to raise
the importance of co-operation. Several Bhutanese, notably
Ngawang and his uncle, explained it in terms of tha damtshig.
Tha damtshig is not only due to one’s elders or one’s family,
or to those of high social rank. Tha damtshig is due to your
community and your neighbors. This was demonstrated when
a mutual friend’s daughter feel seriously ill. Ngawang spent
three days and nights with the family looking after her. He
took her pulse, checked her urine, and prepared medicines
for her, as well as assisting Sengge in performing various
rituals in front of the family shrine.
Although my observations among ordinary Bhutanese
men and women suggested that tha damtshig remains an
important social value, concerns were expressed over
who should be passing on Bhutanese values and customs.
Should it be school teachers acting as role models, or
should parents and grandparents take responsibility for
teaching their children? The process of the internalisation of
traditional values, of tha damtshig, begins in childhood and,
in general, most Bhutanese agree that children should start
being taught them from infancy. The period from infancy
until their entry into primary school has been stressed
as a vital period to teach children the “traditional values”
(Kuensel, 10 July 1999:5). In a recent study of values in
Bhutan “being guided and united by a common set of values
and a common direction”, as well as “moral structure that
provides guidance and encourages comfort” were identified
as key values underpinning Bhutanese cultural values (Evans,
2009). However, the patterns of family life, especially close
contact between children and grandparents in Thimphu,
are changing. Children raised in Thimphu are experiencing
closer peer group contact as increasingly both parents may be
in full-time employment, whilst grandparents may reside in
distant parts of the country and rarely visit Thimphu.
The transmission of “traditional Bhutanese values” is a
matter for ongoing debate in contemporary urban and rural
Bhutan. In his coronation address in November 2008, HM
Jigme Khesar Wangchuck stated that:
Throughout my reign I will never rule you as a King.
I will protect you as a parent, care for you as a brother
and serve you as a son. I shall give you everything
and keep nothing; I shall live such a life as a good
human being that you may find it worthy to serve as an
example for your children; I have no personal goals
other than to fulfill your hopes and aspirations. I
shall always serve you, day and night, in the spirit of
kindness, justice and equality. (emphasis added).
(HM Jigme Khesar Wangchuck,
Kuensel 8 November 2008)

The language used by the king in his coronation address

emphasises a familial bond between the Bhutanese people
and the monarch. As monarch, he hopes to serve as an
example for young Bhutanese, yet as noted earlier, there is a
distance between the king and the ordinary Bhutanese that
makes him too distant from the everyday lives of the young
to be an effective exemplar. However, the speech does reemphasis the reciprocal nature of tha damtshig—as the people
of Bhutan expressed their devotion to the young king across
Bhutan at the time of his coronation, the king acknowledged
and reciprocated their respect.
Frequently the emphasis in many of the descriptions
of tha damtshig I heard or read, was on the creation and
maintenance of social harmony. As described above, social
harmony is central to the Bhutanese perception of society
and community. By internalising tha damtshig, a person
learns how to negotiate his or her way through life and to
lead a socially fulfilling life. Where the harmony is disrupted
by disagreement or other difficulty, it is important that the
matter is resolved and that social harmony is restored.

National Identity and Traditional
Values: Education and belonging
A Bhutanese saying touches on the transformations
experienced throughout life and recognises that nothing is
unchanging:
There are nine transformations in a man’s
life. If it is not nine, it’s eighteen
(van Driem 1998:436)

Although tha damtshig is considered to be important,
several Bhutanese stressed the importance of thinking
about what it means, and not simply accepting something
because one’s parents or teacher “tells you to”. This raises two
important and interlinked issues. Education has been central
to the process of development in Bhutan since the 1960s. As
in neighboring Nepal, the school curriculum has sought to
promote government policies. The foreword to one senior
school text states that, “The Education Division is making
all endeavours in fulfilling the directives issued by the Royal
Government to make education meaningful to our children
and outline the roles they are expected to play as future citizens
of the country” (CAPSS 1997:iii). This is echoed in a text book
written for Class IX–X, Bhutan Civics that describes civic
duties and responsibilities as meaning that “each individual
citizen has a moral responsibility to assist the government in
implementing national policies and in maintaining peace and
prosperity in the country” (RGB 1999b: 6). The emergence
of the nation-state as a political entity during the twentieth
century and in particular in the second half has transformed
the political and social landscapes. Loyalty, as tha damtshig is
translated in a recent Dzongkha language textbook (1991) has
acquired an abstract quality.
The second issue relates to the broader theme of the
development of the nation-state, during the second half of the

79

HIMALAYA XXVIII (1-2) 2008

twentieth century. Although the Drukpa state was established
in the seventeenth century, allegiance and loyalty were
probably more localised and based on personal relationships
than on abstract notions of loyalty to the state or nation.23
The emergence of a stronger centralised government under
the monarchy, especially under the third king, supported the
development of a new political language about the “nation”
that came to the fore in the 1980s and 1990s in Bhutan.
The role of education in creating an image of a modern,
united nation-state is salient for the role of the schools as
sites for promoting development and a particular vision of
the Bhutanese nation. However, there was and remains an
on-going tension as a balance between social and economic
change and Bhutanese traditions and values is sought.
This theme remains ever present and was illustrated in the
coronation address of the fifth king in 2008. Speaking about
the future and Bhutan’s value, HM Jigme Khesar stated:
As citizens of a spiritual land you treasure the
qualities of a good human being—honesty, kindness,
charity, integrity, unity, respect for our culture
and traditions . . . Throughout our history our
parents have upheld these values and placed the
common good above the self. My deepest concern
is that as the world changes we may lose these
fundamental values on which rest our character as
a nation and people. It is critical that we are able to
recognise Bhutanese character irrespective of how
far we look back into the past or into the future.
(HM Jigme Khesar Wangchuck,
Kuensel 8 November 2008)

The significance of tha damtshig as underlying
organisational value or concept in Bhutanese society has
without doubt been used in recent years as part of a new
vocabulary that seeks to create and foster a shared Bhutanese
identity. As a result, its meaning may be interpreted in terms
of its function as part of a modern political discourse, rather
than as timeless truths. This dimension of tha damtshig and
driglam namzha are explored in by Karma Phutnsho (2004).
Herzfeld suggests “the use of moral-value terms represent
social diagnoses of where the boundaries lie” (1996:45).
This can be illustrated by an oath and written pledge to be
administered on the appointment of a new member of the
judiciary.
I . . . in the name of the Triple Gem and the
guardian deities of the Kingdom of Bhutan do
solemnly swear and affirm that I will faithfully
perform the duties of my office without fear or
favour, affection or ill-will and will to the best of
my ability, preserve, protect and defend Tsa Wa Sum
with Tha damstig and Ley Jumdrey. (RCJ 2000:5).24
23. See Whitecross (2010).
24. I have retained the anglicised spelling used in Act of Ley Jumdrey.

Virtuous Beings/Whitecross

Here the terms tha damtshig and lejumdre (Tib/Dz:
las rgyu ‘bras–cause and effect) are heightened in their
significance by being linked to the concept of Tsa Wa Sum
(“the three foundations”)—king, people and nation.25 The
use of traditional concepts of behavior, respect and duty by
the Bhutanese state merits its own consideration.26 Karma
Phuntsho publicly voiced his concerns over what he saw as
the mixing of traditional values with a new political rhetoric
that conflates what he views as traditional Bhutanese values
with loyalty to the state (2004). His arguments are important
for they seek to generate a public debate within Bhutan. To
what extent that has occurred is hard to gauge—I do believe
his provocative article illustrates the need for public reflection
on what are held up to be “Bhutanese values”. From my own
observations, I think there is a tension between how they are
used and understood by the majority of rural Bhutanese and
the way the urban, educated Bhutanese understand and use
them. Several Bhutanese described feeling that the urban
voices “are louder” suggesting that the views of the rural
Bhutanese may be subtly altered by those perceived to be
better “educated”. Phuntsho himself comments on this rural/
urban divide and is critical of the invocation of traditional
values by urban Bhutanese when they themselves do not
uphold them.

Conclusion: Moral Values in a Changing
World
In my paper, I have outlined one of the principle features
of the moral landscape of the Bhutanese. Bourdieu comments
that:
It is not easy to evoke the subjective experience
associated with this world of the realised ought to
be, in which things that could scarcely be otherwise
nonetheless are what they are only because they
are what they ought to be, in which an agent can
have at one and the same time the feeling that
there is nothing to do except what he is doing and
that he is doing only what he ought (1977:166).

In trying to express an understanding of the moral basis of
Bhutanese society, one is faced with the task of trying to grasp
hold of something, which for many appears to be fading away.
Parrish comments “Events, actions, practices acquire moral
force because people live in an actual world, but partly in terms
of a possible world—dreamed of in the moral imagination”
(1994:287). Beyond the imagined moral unity of Bhutanese
society there are different “possible worlds” emerging. The
There is a general lack of consistency over the anglicised spelling of
Dzongkha words.
25. Dzongkha Rabsel Lamzang (1990:198) gives a different, yet
significant, definition for tsa wa gsum as being “the king, the government and
the kingdom”. The Dzongkha reads “ ‘brug gi rtsa ba gsum zer mi ‘di ‘brug
rgyal po ‘brug gzhung ‘brug rgyal khab gsum lu slab ain”.
26. Paper in progress
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values discussed go beyond respect and an acceptance of the
status quo—they convey ideas concerning morality, justice,
duty and obligation, relatedness and affection.
To these ideals newer forms of expression and nuances
are being introduced—notions of citizenship and political
participation, of human rights and enterprise. In March
2008, the first general elections based on competing
political parties was held and in July 2008 the first written
constitution for the country was enacted. In his discussion
of the transmission of “traditional values” Wangyal argues
that they can be interpreted “from the point of view of social
justice”(2001:112). Similarly, the Royal Court of Justice
emphasises the correspondence between Buddhist principles
and contemporary socio-legal concerns. The Constitution
sets out both the rights and the responsibilities of Bhutanese
citizens—nothing surprising for a western lawyer, yet one
can see in the Constitution the influence of local Bhutanese
values, including tha damtshig that will shape the application
and interpretation of the constitution.
Moral values and the meanings they construct are active
features of social life. The discussions and concerns of my
Bhutanese informants, whether concerning the purchase
of land, the breakdown of a marriage, or accusations of
witchcraft, cannot be separated easily from the meanings
created by cultural practice, informed by the available
discourse of moral values. Yet, this discourse drawing
on various visions of the past, of national identity and the
tensions between the transformation of Bhutan and increasing
external influences, is far from homogenous. In seeking to
create a sense of national identity and unity in the face of the
apparent onslaught of non-Bhutanese ideas and values, tha
damtshig has been politicised.
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